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Introduction
How big is the artificial shifting of profits by multinational
companies to tax havens, and who benefits/loses from it?
An important question for:
Study of the redistributive effects of globalization
Measurement of global economic activity
Tax policy and tax enforcement
Our contribution: we analyze new data
capturing profit-shifting to tax havens
Systematic analysis of balance of payments & national
accounts data published by tax havens & counterparties
EU tax havens report detailed data to Eurostat →
enable to estimate amount of profits artificially shifted
Recent improvement in service trade coverage →
enable to estimate which countries lose revenue
→ Comprehensive estimate of size of global profit-shifting
and revenue implications for governments worldwide
Our results: artificial profit-shifting
redistributes tax revenue massively
45% of multinationals’ profits are artificially shifted to tax
havens → more than e600bn in 2015
Global corporate tax revenue loss around e200bn
per year ( ≈ 12% of global corporate tax revenue)
Under most sensible apportionment rule, European Union
is the main loser (loses ≈ 20% of its revenue)
Main winners: Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg
(impose low rates of 2–3%, but on huge artificial base)
The E.U. loses about 20% of its
corporate tax revenue in tax havens
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
Ge
rm
an
y 
Fr
an
ce
 
Hu
ng
ary
 
Ita
ly 
EU
22
 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m 
Sp
ain
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Au
str
ia 
Fin
lan
d 
Es
ton
ia 
De
nm
ark
 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
Po
lan
d 
La
tvi
a 
Cr
oa
tia
 
Gr
ee
ce
 
Slo
ve
nia
 
Lit
hu
an
ia 
Cz
ech
 R
ep
ub
lic
 
Ro
ma
nia
 
Slo
va
kia
 
Bu
lga
ria
 
Lost corporate tax revenue due to artificial profit-shifting  
(% of  corporate tax revenue collected) 
Profits shifted to non-EU tax havens 
Profits shifted to EU tax havens 
Note:  This figure shows the amount of  tax revenue lost because of the artificial shifting of multinationals' profits to tax havens, as a share of total 
corporate tax revenue collected in 2015.  
The failure of enforcement
Why high-tax countries fail to stop profit-shifting:
Tax authorities have incentives to go after transfer
mispricing involving other high-tax countries
This crowds out enforcement on tax havens
We analyze new data showing that in practice, almost
all enforcement is against other high-tax countries
→ In effect, high-tax countries are stealing from
each other while letting tax havens flourish
Implications for policy
BEPS reinforces perverse incentives of current system:
Makes it easier to go after profits shifted to other
high-tax countries...
... Further crowding out enforcement on 0-tax
countries where bulk of shifting tax place
There is a simple fix to this problem:
Sales apportionment of global profits
Can be done unilaterally
Methodology to estimate
the size and cost of profit-shifting
Main challenge in the literature:
little data on what happens in tax havens
Widely used source to study profit-shifting: financial
accounts micro-data (e.g., Orbis) and customs data
Face two key challenges:
Orbis: misses most of the subsidiaries in tax havens
Customs: miss service trade (e.g., intangibles)
→ Big disconnect between public debate (which focuses
on 0-tax countries and intangibles) and economic research
Example: Google Alphabet
Google transferred its intangibles to hybrid Irish–Bermuda
subsidiary in 2003
In 2015, made $15.5bn in profits in 0-tax Bermuda
→ invisible in Orbis
Which country loses tax revenue: US? EU?
→ Impossible to tell with available micro data
Which country wins: Bermuda? Ireland? None?
Why do high-tax countries fail to tax these earnings?
Most of Google’s profits are invisible in
financial accounts data
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Note: This graph shows Google's global consolidated profits, and the sum of the profits made by Google's subsidiaries, as recorded in 
Orbis. The difference is due to the fact that the subsidiaries where Google makes the bulk of its profits are not visible in Orbis.  
Most of Apple’s profits are invisible in
financial accounts data
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Note: This graph shows Apple's global consolidated profits, and the sum of the profits made by Apple's subsidiaries, as recorded in Orbis. 
The difference is due to the fact that the subsidiaries where Apple makes the bulk of its profits are not visible in Orbis.  
None of Facebook’s profits are visible in
financial accounts data
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Note: This graph shows Facebook's global consolidated profits, and the sum of the profits made by Facebook's subsidiaries, as recorded 
in Orbis. The difference is due to the fact that the subsidiaries where Facebook makes the bulk of its profits are not visible in Orbis.  
Most of Nike’s profits are invisible in
financial accounts data
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Note: This graph shows Nike's global consolidated profits, and the sum of the profits made by Nike's subsidiaries, as recorded in Orbis. 
The difference is due to the fact that the subsidiaries where Nike makes the bulk of its profits are not visible in Orbis.  
How we track artificial profit-shifting
We focus on macro data (more comprehensive than
financial accounts micro-data)
Consider two key macro statistics in each country:
pi = taxable corporate profits / compensation of
employees
φ = taxable corporate profits accruing to foreigners /
national income
High pi: abnormally high profits. High φ: profits are made
in foreign-owned subsidiaries.
Abnormal profitability pi
pi is related to the capital share in the corporate sector α
If no net interest paid by corporations, pi = α/(1− α)
With identical technology and α = 25%, all countries
should have pi = 33%
If net interest paid = p% of operating surplus,
pi = α/(1− α) · (1− p)
If pi >> 33%: inward profit-shifting (either through
real transactions or interest payments)
Corporations in tax havens are abnormally
profitable
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Taxable corporate profits 
(% of  compensation of  employees)  
Note: This figure shows the ratio of corporate profits (net of interest paid and depreciation) to compensation of employees, as 
recorded in the national accounts, in 2015.  
Average among non-havens: 34% 
Corporate profits accruing to foreigners φ
φ is related to current account balance ca, trade surplus
t, and net interest received from abroad i (all in % of NI)
ca = (t + i)− φ
Inward profit-shifting (Ireland, Luxembourg, ...):
(t + i) > 0 and φ > 0
Outward profit-shifting (U.S., France, ...):
(t + i) < 0 and φ < 0
→ These identities summarize how profit-shifting affects
balance of payments and national accounts statistics
Tax havens run huge trade surplus, all
paid back to foreign parents
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Note:  This figure shows the current account balance of a selection of countries, as a share of their Gross National Income in 2015. 
EU22 is the Euoropean Union minus the 6 EU tax havens (Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Netherlands). 
 
How we measure artificial profit-shifting
We compute artificial profits by setting pii = p¯i in all tax
havens i
Assumption: all profitability in tax havens above world
average p¯i reflects inward profit-shifting
Potential limitation: high pii could be due to other
factors (technology, bargaining, etc.)
But testable: correlation between pii and
foreign-ownership φi
Where profits are abnormally high, they
are all within MNEs → artificial
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How we allocate the artificially-shifted
profits across countries
Benchmark allocation: based on which countries import
from (and pay interest to) tax havens
Focus on high-risk service imports (IP, financial
services, etc.), particularly conducive of shifting
Mimics a sales-apportioned corporate tax base (= how
California, New York, etc., tax profits)
Alternative allocation: based on residence of owner
Mimics a residence-based corporate tax base (= how
U.S. has taxed profits so far)
Profit-Shifting to
European Tax Havens
Data for E.U. tax havens
6 EU havens: Netherl., Ireland, Lux., Malta, Cyprus, Belg.
Key advantage: report bilateral data to Eurostat
Service exports more reliable than imports (services
sold from LU to FR person unrecorded in FR: Spotify)
Limitation: miss some profits (hybrid corp,
inconsistent definition of residency)
We fix this by forcing consistency with U.S. data on
profits made by U.S. multinationals
Service exports recorded by havens are
more reliable than imports rec by importer
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Note: EU22 is the European Union minus the 6 EU tax havens (Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, and Belgium). 
Service imports from tax havens are
under-estimated by importers (B2C sales)
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At least 30% of the services exported by
EU havens go unreported by the importer
-10% 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
EU22 EU6 Luxembourg Ireland Belgium Netherlands Malta Cyprus 
Missing service exports, % of  total service exports  
Note: Service exports include exports to all EU22 countries (EU26 minus Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Malta, Cyprus).  
 
Some profits made by U.S. MNEs are
missing in EU havens’ national accounts
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Taxable corporate profits  
(% of  compensation of  employees)  
Missing profits of  U.S. multinationals 
As reported in the national accounts 
Note: The blue bar shows the ratio of corporate profits (net of interest and depreciation) to compensation of employees, as 
recorded in the national accounts, in 2015. The red bar adds corporate profits missing in the national accounts, computed as the 
discrepancy between FDI income credits reported by the U.S. and total FDI income debits. 
Average among non-havens: 34% 
A growing amount of profits is artificially
shifted to the EU havens
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Taxable corporate profits in Ireland  
(% compensation of  employees) 
By applying very low rates on a huge
base, EU havens generate a lot of revenue
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Note:  European Union is the average of France, Germany, U.K., and Italy. 
Ireland 
European Union 
By applying very low rates on a huge
base, EU havens generate a lot of revenue
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Note:  This figure shows the amount of tax revenue collected on artificially shifted profits and the implied rate at which these 
profits are taxed. The revenue collected on artificially shifted profits are calculated as the amount of revenue collected above 
the average corporate income tax revenue in all non-haven EU countries (scaled by GNI). 
Global Profit-Shifting
Close to 20% of global profits are made
by multinationals abroad
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Notes: This figure charts the share of global corporate profits made by multinational corporations. Multinational profits are defined as the sum of 
portfolio equity and FDI equity income receipts across all countries. We subtract income received by tax havens to avoid double counting. Multinational 
profits were around €1.4 trillion in 2015, while global corporate profits were around €7.9 trillion.  
45% of multinationals’ foreign profits are
artificially shifted to tax havens
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Note:  This figure shows the amount of taxable profits artificially shifted to tax havens in 2015. The total adds up to 
627 billion euros, of which 334 billion is shifted to non EU tax havens, and 293 billion is shifted to EU tax havens.  
% of MNE profits 
63% of the foreign profits made by US
multinationals are shifted to tax havens
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The share of tax havens in U.S. corporate profits made abroad 
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Notes: This figure charts the share of income on U.S. direct investment abroad made in the main tax havens. In 2016, total income on U.S. DI abroad was about 
$450bn. 16% came from the Netherlands, 8% from Luxembourg, etc. Source: author's computations using balance of payments data, see Online Appendix. 
Allocating the profits artificially shifted
offshore: sales vs. residence
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 Allocation of  profits artificially shifted to tax havens 
Benchmark scenario: High risk imports 
from tax havens 
Residence scenario 
Note:  In the benchmark scenario, offshore profts are allocated proportionally to the sum of high-risk services imported from 
and FDI interest paid tax havens. In the "residence" scenario, offshore profits are allocated based each country's share of global 
FDI income credits. 
EU and US lose almost 20% of their
corporate tax revenue
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Note:  In the benchmark scenario, offshore profts are allocated proportionally to the sum of high-risk services imported from 
and FDI interest paid tax havens. In the "residence" scenario, offshore profits are allocated based each country's share of global 
FDI income credits. 
EU and US lose about e60bn annually
due to the artificial shifting of profits
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Note:  In the benchmark scenario, offshore profts are allocated proportionally to the sum of high-risk services imported from 
and FDI interest paid tax havens. In the "residence" scenario, offshore profits are allocated based each country's share of global 
FDI income credits. 
The higher the corporate tax rate, the
more profits are shifted
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Lost corporate tax revenue due to artificial profit-shifting  
(% of  corporate tax revenue collected) 
Profits shifted to non-EU tax havens 
Profits shifted to EU tax havens 
Corporate tax rate (avg. 2010-2015) 
Note:  This figure shows the amount of  tax revenue lost because of the artificial shifting of multinationals' profits to tax havens, as a share of total 
corporate tax revenue collected in 2015. The grey line shows the top statutory corporate tax rates.  
The failure of tax enforcement
The perverse incentives involved in
enforcing arm’s length prices
High-tax ctries have incentives to go after other high-tax:
Danish tax authority (tax rate 24.5%) can go after
mispricing involving Bermuda (0%) or Germany (30%)
MNEs make it hard to go after Bermuda (they would
lose revenue) and easy to go after Germany (they win)
Mutual agreement procedures facilitate resolve of
disputes among OECD countries (eg, Denmark–Ger.)
Most transfer price enforcement is against
other high-tax countries
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
EU high tax country EU tax haven 
% of  total 
Counterpart in Mutual Agreement Procedures  in the EU 
Note: The graph plots the distribution of the value of mutual agreement procedures in the EU by  counterpart. Mutual agreement procedures are cases in which the country 
conducting a transfer pricing correction (and thus raises the taxable income in the home country) will approach  the  counterpart country (the country accussed of having excessive 
profits) and ask them to lower their tax base. The counterpart is the country that the Danish tax authority argue have received excessive taxable profits.  The graph shows that 65% 
of the value of transfer pricing corrections concerns a high tax country (Non tax haven).  
E.U. tax authorities barely attempt to go
after profits shifted to tax havens
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Note: The graph plots the distribution of the number of transfer price corrections by counterpart. Transfer price corrections are cases in which the Danish tax authority have 
corrected an intra-group cross-border transfer price and as a result raised the taxable profits of firms operating in Denmark. The counterpart is the country that the Danish tax 
authority argue have received excessive taxable profits.  The graph shows that the counterpart in 40% of the cases is a high tax EU country (Non tax haven) and in 24% of the cases 
is a non-EU high tax country.  
E.U. collects negligible revenue by
correcting transfer prices involving havens
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Note: The graph plots the distribution of the value of transfer price corrections by  counterpart. Transfer price corrections are cases in which the Danish tax authority have corrected 
an intra-group cross-border transfer price and as a result raised the taxable profits of firms operating in Denmark. The counterpart is the country that the Danish tax authority argue 
have received excessive taxable profits.  The graph shows that 65% of the value of transfer pricing corrections concerns a high tax country (Non tax haven).  
As settlement is facilitated, high-tax to
high-tax disputes are growing
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Note: The graph plots the development in the number of  mutual agreement procedures (MAP cases) in the OECD. Mutual agreement procedures are cases in which the country 
conducting a transfer price correction (and thus raises the taxable income in the home country) will approach  the  counterpart country (the country accused of having excessive 
profits) and ask them to lower their tax base. New MAP cases are cases initiated within a given year. Inventory of MAP cases is the total of cases currently in process, that is both 
new plus cases from previous years that have not been convluded.  
Conclusion
Profit-shifting and weak enforcement are
leading to a race to the bottom
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The race to the bottom is accelerating
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Reforming the corporate tax
Apportionment of global profits proportionally to
where sales are made
Removes any possibility to shift profits, and any
incentives for real tax competition
Works reasonably well for US States
Can be done unilaterally
Would increase corp tax revenue by about 20% in
U.S. and Europe
